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March 2 , 1970 
• 
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE 
the direct election bernu~c I believe Umf 
fully one-half of the Members of the 
Senate s.re opposed to th e direct syslem 
but they would be unable to agree on 
any substitute plan. 
For that reason, it seems likely to the 
junior Senator from Alabama that there 
will be no reform at this point. Does t he 
Senator feel that that is a likelihooa ·> 
Mr. CURTIS. I do. There are 34 of 
the 50 States that would be adverselv 
affected if we changed to the direc.t 
election of the President. I do not be-
lieve they have any such mandate f1 om 
the people back home to lessen the 
power of their sovereign States in choos-
ing the President. 
Mr. ALLEN. The Senator's argumen1. 
is that the voter in Nebraska wants to go 
to the polls feeling he is going to be a 
part of the Nebraska vote, and when the 
Nebraska vote is counted it will count 
for something because it will be repre-
sented in the electoral vote of the State 
of braska. It will not be commingled 
wit 75 million other votes, and will be 
·de tified with that single State . 
. CURTIS. When I cast my vote in 
·aska, it will not be bUlied under a 
bstone in Chicago. 
ORDER OF BUSINESS 
The PRESII)H'(G OFFICER (Mr. HART 
in the cha~Under the previous order, 




Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I 
take the ft.oor of the Senate at this time 
because of the serious situation in Laos. 
I do so not to criticize, but, if possible, 
to be constructive, to be helpful, and to 
wave a warning flag about this area 
which might perhaps be helpful in pre-
venting our becoming involved too deep-
ly and in too costly a manner. When I 
speak of costly, I do not mean money 
alone, but total cost, including man-
power. 
Perhaps, the Pathet Lao and their 
North Vietnamese allles may btop the 
offensive on the Plain of Jars, short of 
the cities of Vientiane and Luang Pra-
bang; that would be in the pattern of 
previous operations. Then again, they 
may push forward against these two 
capitals and press to the border of Thai-
land. Only time will indicate what plans 
and objectives may be involved . In any 
event, the question of the "nonwar" or 
the "secret-war" or "interlude war" in 
Laos cannot be avoided any longer. 
Notwithstanding the Geneva accord of 
1962, the North Vietna mese are deeply 
involved in this military situation. So, 
too, is the United States. Press r eports 
indicate that the Thais may also be en-
gaged. The involvement is so transparent 
on both sides as to make less than useless 
the effort to main tain the fiction of the 
accord or even to exchange charge and 
countercharge of violations. We are both 
in it-North Vietnamese and Ameli-
cans--and we are in it up to our necks. 
What disturbs me is that it is not only 
that both naLions are forbidden by the 
G€'neva ag-reement to use forces in Laos 
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b'•lt tha~ the P"re11ident ha3 also made 
elnr that h#, doe <; not de~ire to see U.S. 
ft~rt;e,. tw-d in LEJ.I)fi . May I add that I 
h&vP ~lf:lY Cl>nfidt-n<:e lu the Pie~d ... nt's 
J/, t,..nt.,,,.~ Y•·t tll•· Plf•: •·!lCf' of Amer-
JMMJ 1l,,JJt>.1·y !!4vj"''I~ ll!lJ! (J\t, eTS 1!1 ! , ;;,()') 
':'J>.JitJ-A 1,.. '~tnlli'J~Ia.ll•f1 "'"'I I'Jnv .. r, 
r>')f.-'lfl•.h~.,.nlllf).g' t.hr. <:ll.rJallr.n r1f Uv~ 
Symington rw(<rint'< 
'I he mili tarv opf'rnt.lons about which 
we know so much. and yet so little, 
seem to depend heavily on 11111 people 
from the Lao-Vietnamese border high-
lands. With these tribesmen, who are not 
Lao but Meo, there has been a close 
U.S. m111tary or paramilitary, connection 
which predates the Geneva Accord of 
1962. According to the press, the connec-
tion is still there. 
In any event, neither the Meo nor the 
Lao regular armies have been able to hold 
back the combined North Vietnamese-
Pathet Lao pressure. The result Is that 
a further "Americanization" of the war 
In Laos has taken place which now seems 
to be matching the effort to "Vietnamize" 
the situation in South Vietnam. It has 
been estimated that American bombers 
make 500 or more sorties dally over Laos 
and that the United States is spending 
something on the order of $200 to $300 
million for aid to Laos. 
It needs to be recalled at this time, 
therefore, that the full-scale U.S. In-
volvement In Vietnam evolved from much 
smaller beginnings. First, It was a little 
more aid and a fe1v more military ad-
visers, then It was the supply of trans-
portation, then air support, and then 
GI's. 
I am sure that the President does not 
want that sequence to be repeated. The 
Defense Department has been at pains to 
gainsay it. In that respect, this Presi-
dent's intentions are not unlike those of 
his predecessor at the beginning of the 
Vietnamese Involvement; the protesta-
tions of this Secretary of Defense also 
have a not unfamiliar ring. Nevertheless, 
a parallel can develop in Laos. Will we 
hear next what became the fateful ra-
tionale of the war in Vietnam? Will we 
hear next that a larger war is not up to 
us but up to them? Will we submerge in 
that rationale. once again, our respon-
sibility to decide where and when in con-
sideration of national interests we shall 
risk the lives of Americans? Will we 
affirm that fundamental responsiblllty 
or leave it to others who have no reason 
to use it for this Nation's well-being? 
To be sure, there :s no question that 
the North Vietnamese have Ignored the 
Geneva accord of 1962 to which they are 
signatory. Does that compel us to take 
It upon ourselves to do the same? There 
are other signatories of the accord. Have 
the others immersed themselves in the 
war? Has the Soviet Union? The United 
Kingdom? France? Indeed, has China? 
How can a deepening involvement in 
Laos accord with the vital interests-
and I use the word advisedly--of this 
Nation? Does it accord with the new Nix-
on doctrine-which I fully support--
which propounds a reduction of our mili-
tary Involvement on the Southeast Asia 
mainland? Does It tlt with the need for 
resources to meet the Inner needs of this 
Nation? 
The North Vietnamese have long since 
moved troops into the border areas of 
Northeastern Laos to guard the so-called 
Ho Chi Minh trails. These are the route'> 
oy mean& of which men and supplles 
move down intn South Vietnam. E~ tile 
~ tok..-n. Ame:i<a::. ;::a.nes ha.-e long 
-~tnce ~ ocmbing ~.::e trails. The bilat-
eral violations or the Geneva. accord in 
this case a.t least have been directly re-
lated to the war in Vietnam. 
Of late, however, both Americans and 
North Vietnamese have expanded mili-
tary activities further into Laos, in the 
region of the Plain of Jars. There is re-
;.Jorted to be something on the order of 
45,000 to 50,000 North Vietnamese now 
on the northern border of Laos. Ac-
cording to reports, not only has man-
power increased but antiaircraft missiles 
have been implanted. On the part of the 
United States the bombing in Laos is 
reported to be heavier tha.'l 1t was in 
North Vietnam and that there could now 
be as many as 20,000 sorties a month. 
In short, the war seems to be pouring 
out of South Vietnam through the Lao-
tian panhandle into the rest of Laoo and 
the rest of Indochina. Even Cambodia, 
which has sought wisely, behind the wall 
of neutrality, to hold back the jungle of 
war has felt, of late, the intensified pres-
sure of this flow of destruction. 
As in 1965, the events In Laos cau-
tion that the threat of a continuing in-
conclusive involvement In Southeast 
Asia remains unchanged. Indeed, It may 
be enlarging to embrace Laos. If the mil-
Itary seesaw goes down In Vietnam only 
to rise In Laos, our situation will not 
have improved; It will have wor~ened. In 
my judgment, only the utmost v!gllence, 
on the part of the responsible officials of 
this Government, of the President, and 
the Senate In particular, and of the press 
will counteract this Inevitable tendency. 
Prince Souvanna Phouma has said that 
he was going to ask cochairmen of the 
Geneva accord, the United Kingdom and 
the Soviet Union, to call a meeting of all 
the signatories to put into effect the 
agreement of 1962. This renewed call Is 
to be commended, and certainly it should 
be supported in every possible way. It 
would be my hope that all signatories to 
the Geneva accord would meet in an 
effort to restore a measure of stability to 
the situation in Laos. Moreover, the 
scope of any such meeting mught be en-
larged to include th esituation in all of 
Southeast Asia, with the partlcipa.t!on 
of other affected nations, such as Cam-
bodia and Thailand. 
If the United Kingdom and the Soviet 
Union, a.s cochairmen, would call this 
conference, it might be possible to draw 
stlll useful guidance from the Geneva 
agreements of 1954 which involved the 
three Indochinese States. As for Laos, the 
agreement of 1962 seems to me, still, to 
be valid. In retrospect, this agreement 
was never given a full opportunity to get 
off the ground. Negotiations In Paris or 
in Geneva but, In any event, at an au-
thoritative level, seem to me stlll to offer 
the best prospect for a settlement which 
would enable the United States to with-
draw completely from the present mili-
tary enmeshment on the Southeast Asia 
mainland. 
When thnt hns <'<'lllt' 1\bnut . it 1\,,uld l><• 
my hope thnt .. 1\.' 0ne ,,r U1t' ~ignnt,,rws 
outside of Sout ht'Rst Asia. we wnukt ,., Ill 
wtth the othf'rs in bnnA fict~ mnlt tlA tr '1 
guarant~e!' of the 111'111 :'1\l:t;:<r of t h:. t :·.-
f"JOn In 1J111t 11l!I.:"L:·,,r 1111' s.m~ l; '"''1"'"' 
of 1~: !\C ~'<.lrt of t.!lt• '\ "'"~-· .. t t!l;.~:!': ~\:.\\t" ~ -. .. 
o~Jtx"~ rtun i:y t.o \W"\"t': .. "'P ~u ~n tth~<l)l("'n~t: ::~ 
manner--an OPIX'rt ttnity "tu.-h cr .. ·, 
have not known for centurks. 
The time is short; the time is n1)W to 
face up to the Implications of this wors-
ening situation In Laos. The danger of 
our over-extended commitment in South-
east Asia needs to be considered frankly 
and without delay. The fact Is that the 
President and the Congress have &till not 
corralled an open~ended mi11tary involve~ 
ment in a part of the world which is nnt 
directly vital to our security, In a part of 
the world In which the involvement was 
a misfortune to begin with and every day 
of Its continuance a tragedy. 
Mr. GURNEY. Mr. President. will thr 
distinguished majority leader yield? 
Mr. MANSFIELD. Yes, indeed. 
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